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Abstract 
This paper proposes a new multi-objective optimization design method based on PCRC (Poor-Competition-Rich-
Cooperation) evolutionary game model where the design goals are seen as game players. All game players 
automatically adjust behavior mode according to evolution rules of PCRC game model. By calculating the impact 
factors of design variables to objective functions and fuzzy clustering, the design variables are divided into strategy 
space of game players. Besides, this paper presents the solution of PCRC evolutionary game method including 
behavior mode of game players and solution steps. Finally, the effectiveness of this method is verified by solving 
multi-objective optimization problems of helical gear transmission. 
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1. Introduction  
Considering the similarity between multi-objective design and the game, game theory has been used to 
solve multi-objective design problems, especially in engineering fields. In non-cooperative game, each 
player benefits from competitive behavior patterns and the typical methods are Nash equilibrium game 
method and the Stackelberg oligopoly game method. The non-cooperative game model based on Nash 
equilibrium optimization method was put forward and was used to get the optimization solution of non-
renewable resource model [1]. Non-cooperative game optimization method based on evolutionary strategy 
in the multi-objective design of the composite laminate was proposed [2]. Non-cooperative game method 
was applied in some engineering examples such as multi-element airfoil aerodynamic optimization, multi-
wing optimization design, multi-standard reverse dynamic optimization [3-4]. In cooperative game, all 
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game players comply with a binding agreement and benefit from cooperative behavior patterns. Multi-
objective optimization method based on cooperative game was first proposed in high-speed mechanical 
devices [5]. Three-tier two- objective optimization methods was proposed to solve the manufacture of 
concurrent product and process optimization [6]. However, whether non-cooperative game method or 
cooperative game method to solve multi-objective design problem, if the game method is selected, 
behavior modes of all players remain unchanged during the whole process. To compensate this deficiency 
and improve the game method for solving multi-objective optimization problems, this article absorbs the 
essence of Chinese traditional culture (“Rich, they make all the world good. Poor, they make themselves 
alone good”. ) and proposes PCRC (Poor-Competition-Rich-Cooperation) evolutionary game method. 
Finally, it is successfully applied in multi-objective optimization of helical gear transmission. 
2. Multi-objective optimization method based on PCRC evolutionary game model  
2.1. Game description for multi-objective optimization problems  
According to game theory, let G represent one game. If G has m  players, the strategy available to 
each game player is called strategy set, which is respectively expressed with 1 2, , , mS S SL and iS  is player 
,i s strategy set. The payoff function of player i is iu . One prerequisite of using game method to solve 
multi-objective optimization problems is that multi-objective optimization problems need to be 
transformed into game problems, which can be expressed as the following three points. 1) m - design 
goals can be regarded as m -game players. There exists function relationship between the objective 
function (f i) and the game player payoff functions ( iu ). 2) Design variables X  can be regarded as a 
collection of all the game strategy
1 2, , , mS S SL  and satisfy 1 ; 0( , 1, , ; )m a bS S X S S a b m a b∪ ∪ = ∩ = = ≠L L . 3) 
The feasible region of design variables can be regarded as a viable strategy. So the game problem of m  
players can be written as 1 1{ , ; , , }m mG S S u u= L L . 
 
2.2. Calculation of strategy space 
(1) Optimize  m   single objective functions respectively and then obtain optimal solution 
* * *
1 1 2 2( ), ( ), , ( )m mf f fX X XL , where  { }* * * *1 2, , , ( 1,2, , )i i i nix x x i m= =X L L . 
(2) To arbitrary design variable jx , it is divided into T fragments according to jxΔ (step length) in 
feasible space and jiΔ  (the impact factor of design variable jx affecting game player i ) can be calculated 
as follows : 
* * * * * * * *
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 (3) Classification entireness of all samples are { }1 2, , , n=Δ Δ Δ ΔL . jΔ (j=1, 2,…n)is the set of 
impact factor (the thj design variable affecting m objective functions). The purpose of classification is to 
cluster strong similarity samples into one sample.  
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Where, ),( lki ΔΔμ  is the fuzzy relation between kΔ  and lΔ  in the thi objective function. 
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Where , ( , )k lσ Δ Δ  is fuzzy nearness degree between kΔ  and lΔ . 
(4) Establish the matrix (0)σ  based on ( , )k lσ Δ Δ  , ( , )kl k lσ σ= Δ Δ  
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(5) Divide variable sets X  into strategy space mSS ,,1 /  according to fuzzy clustering results, then 
put mSS ,,1 /  to the corresponding game players according to the average impact factor. 
 
2.3. Clustering analysis steps 
(1) Stipulate M  (control value of systematic classification) and P  (the largest number of samples). 
Classification entireness is nΔΔΔ ,,, 21 / and constitute the matrix (0)σ based on 







= , merge aΔ  and bΔ as a new sample named sΔ . If the sample number of sΔ is 
greater than P , then merge the second largest value in (0)σ  as a new sample. 
(3) Combine ),;,,2,1( bcacncc ≠≠= /Δ with sΔ as a new classification system, then constitute 
a new matrix (1)σ { min( , )cs ca cbσ σ σ= }, where csσ  is fuzzy nearness degree of cΔ and sΔ . 
(4) Repeat steps (1), (2), (3) until the system category number is equal to the control value M . 
 
2.4. Behavior modes of game players 






u =                                                                                                                                       (5) 
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Where if  is the initial value of the thi objective function. if  is the current value of the thi objective 
function. 
(2) Cooperative behavior. Its characteristic is cooperative collectivism and its corresponding payoff 



















=∑ , iiw  reflects the cooperative degree. If its value is large, the degree of cooperative 
behavior is small. 
 
2.5. Rules of evolution 
PCRC evolutionary game method formulates the corresponding rules of evolution: (1) When the 
payoff function value of this round is worse than the initial design, it adopts non-cooperative behavior in 
the next round. (2) When the payoff objective function value of this round is better than the initial design, 
it adopts cooperative behavior in the next round. (3) All game players adopt cooperative behavior in the 
first round game. 
 
2.6. Solution steps 
 
Fig. 1. Solving map of PCRC evolutionary game method 
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Fig.1 is the solving map of PCRC evolutionary game method and the detailed solution steps are as 
follows. 
(1) Obtain 1, , mLS S attached to each game player by computing impact factor and doing fuzzy 
clustering. 
(2) Establish corresponding payoff functions of game players according to formula (5) and (6). 
(3) Generate { })0()0(2)0(1)0( ,,, mssss /= in each player’s strategy space randomly as initial feasible 
strategy. 
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(5) Let )0()0(2
)0(
1 ,,, msss /  be )0()0(2)0(1 ,,, msss /  supplementary set in strategy set )0(s . For the 
thi player ),,2,1( mi /= , fix )0(is according to the player’s payoff iu , then begin the single objective 
optimization design in strategy space iS which belongs to the player i. 
Seek the best solution: ii Ss ∈
* , Let payoff be: min),( )0(* →iii ssu  




mssss ∪∪∪= / , tests )1(s feasibility, if it dissatisfies, goes to step 3, 
otherwise computes the distance (a kind norm) to check whether it satisfies convergence criterion 
(1) (0)s s ε− ≤ according to the before and after strategy set ; if  true, the game is over, otherwise 
)1(s replaces )0(s and goes to step 4  for  recycling. 
3.  Application in multi-objective optimization of the helical gear transmission 
3.1. Design variables and objective functions 
According to [7], this paper selects normal module ( nm ), teeth number of small helical gear ( 1Z ), helix 
angle in radians (β ) and the gear width coefficient ( dψ ) as design variables. Therefore, the optimal 
design variables are: 1 2 3 4 1( , , , ) ( , , , )
T T
n dX x x x x m Z β ψ= = . Take the volume of small and large helical 
gear ( 1( )f X ) and the opposite number of overlap ratio ( 2 ( )f X ) as objective functions: 
3 21






                                                                                                            (7)                               
2 1
1 1
1 1( ) (0.318 tan ) [1.88 3.2( )]r df X Z Z iZ
ε ψ β= − = − − − +                                                                         (8) 
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Where, i is transmission ratio and rε is overlap ratio. Therefore, multi-objective optimization 
functions of the helical gear transmission are: 
1 2[ ( ), ( )] minF f X f X= →  
All known conditions and relevant constraints have been stated [8]. Besides, 1Z must be integer and 
nm should select the standard value. For these two variables, they are initially treated by two continuous 
variables. Finally, we need to choose an integer closest to convergence value as the final solution of 1Z  
and choose a standard value closest to convergence value as the final solution of nm . 
 
3.2. Single-objective optimization results and impact factors 
(1) Single-objective optimization results 
{ }0.61285,0.34132,18.07952,4.97397*1 =X , 1 1 3* 1.0877E+0( ) 7mmf X = . 
*
2 43.24134,92.39519,0.33769,1.07 4{ }82X = , *2 2 -12.( ) 9627f X = . 
(2) Calculation results of the impact factors 
Table 1   Impact factors 
Design Variables 










 85.648 2.056 1.084 1.632 
Objective Functions  
2f
 0.000 0.009 2.607 0.796 
 
3.3. Strategy space 
According to Table1, Δ1＝{85.648,0.000},Δ2＝{2.056,0.009}, Δ3＝{1.084,2.607}, Δ4＝{1.632,0.796}. 
Because the number of optimization objective function and design variable are two and four respectively, 
let M  (control value of systematic classification) be equal to two, P  (the largest number of samples) be 
equal to three. The matrix (0)σ , (1)σ based on ( , )k lσ Δ Δ is as follows. 
(0)
 1.0000000     0.6191701   0.6106779    0.6164957
         
0.6191701     1.0000000   0.5562953    0.5459411 
0.6106779     0.5562953   1.0000000    0.5631173    
         
 0.6164957     0.5459411   
σ =
0.5631173    1.0000000
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
(1)
1.0000000 0.5562953 0.5459411 
0.5562953 1.0000000 0.5631173
0.5459411 0.5631173  1.0000000
σ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪
= ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
In the (0)σ , because the maximum value is 0.6191701, Design variables 1x and 2x  are classified to 
one strategy space called aS . In the 
(1)σ , because the maximum value is 0.5631173, Design variables 
3x and 4x  are classified to one strategy space called bS .According to Table1, calculate the average 
impact factors of aS  to f1, f2 and bS  to f1, f2. 
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Table 2   Average impact factors of strategy space to objective functions 
Strategy Space 












The maximum value is 43.852, so },{ 21 xxSa = , belongs to 1f . 3 4{ , }bS x x= , belongs to 2f . 
 
3.4. Calculation results 
When )2,1(5.0 == iwii  and )(5.0 jiwij ≠= , calculation starts from the initial strategy X0= (4.0, 26.0, 
0.15, 1.0) and obtains convergence value X*= (3.0014, 24.63618, 0.3475, 1.1995) after 10 round game 
and f1= 1.1915E+07 mm3, f2= -5.1280 (namely, rε is 5.1280). Figure 2 is the comparison of iterative 
process of two game methods 
 
Fig. 2 Comparison of iterative process of two game methods 
Because 1Z must be integer and nm should select the appropriate standard value, the final results based 
on PCRC evolutionary game method are nm =3, 1Z =25, β = 0.3475, dψ =1.1995. Table 3 shows the 
comparative results. 
 
Table 3  Comparative results  
 
By analyzing the results shown in Fig.2 and Table3, we can know that the f1 of PCRC evolutionary 
game is better than the results [7] but worse than the results [8] and f2 is better than the results [8] but 
 Design Variables Objective functions 
 x1 x2 x3  x4  f1 -f2  
Results [7] 
3 31 0.3491 1.2000 2.3752E+07 6.0608 
Results [8] 3 24 0.3490 1.1998 1.1019E+07 5.0521 
Results of this paper 3 25 0.3475 1.1995 1.2432E+07 5.1803 
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worse than the results [7]. So multi-objective optimization method based on PCRC evolutionary game 
model is effective. 
4.  Conclusion 
(1) The essence of game methods is negotiations of multi-players and game method is not suitable for 
problems that the number of design variables is less than the number of design goals and specially 
suitable for engineering structure design problems that the relationship between the variables and 
optimization goals is complex and the mutual coupling or conflict between the goals is strong and subtle 
change of one goal's strategy will lead to significant influence to other goals. 
(2) The advantages of PCRC evolutionary game method lie in four fields: 1) “Autonomy”. Determine 
the evolution of behavior according to satisfaction degree of their own goals. 2) “Ability to adjust 
quickly”. It can quickly do adjustment in the next round according to satisfaction degree in the current 
round. 3) “Friendliness”. All game players first adopt cooperative behavior. 4) “Clarity”. Evolution of the 
rules are clear and easy to understand. 
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